There is a saying “It’s like comparing apples and oranges”. This means that it is seems impossible to compare two very different things. Sure, they are both fruit. But ask yourself, which is best? The only answer seems to be “I like oranges best” (or of course you might like apples). However, this is just your view and not really a comparison.

In academic writing you have to solve a similar problem. You must evaluate two (or more) different arguments or theories.

One way of comparing two things which seem very different is by comparing the properties that they share. For example if you are packing your bag for a long day out and so you want to minimise the weight of your bag, then you might choose either an apple or an orange because one is lighter than the other. In this case you are choosing the lightest on the basis that they have a common property, i.e. they both have a weight. This common property allows you to make a comparison. So through their properties – what they have in common – they can be compared.

In academic comparisons you perform a similar trick. However in this case you are not dealing with simple physical properties. Rather you are using abstract properties – in other words concepts. So two academic arguments can be understood in relationship to one another through how they understand or deal with common abstract ideas or theories

Let’s take the example of politics. One of the most frequent abstract properties of political arguments is that they have an explicit (or perhaps an implied) view of the state. By laying out the two views of the state that are found in the two arguments side by side we can really begin to compare the two. We are in effect using the concept of the state to get the two arguments to interact with one another

By using these concepts we are moving beyond first impressions or feelings about the arguments

Or take another example: literature. In this case we may not be comparing arguments simply put. Instead we may be comparing theories. For example, we might want to compare how two theories interpret a piece of literature, e.g. Marxism and feminism. We might discuss the meaning given by theory A to a scene followed by the meaning given by theory B to a scene (or just one aspect of a scene). Again by laying out the two interpretations side by side we are comparing their ability to explain what is going on and get at the underlying meanings (which is what theories are supposed to do). Here we might bring out the strengths and weaknesses of the two theories in their ability to explain – and also in how they overlap in their explanation.

Currently in UK secondary education it seems to be common practice to teach comparisons by listing the good and bad features of something, e.g. they have plus points and minus points, good points and bad points, positives and negatives. However, this is not good enough for how we analyse concepts at university. We are not looking for a list of simplistic points and, let’s face it, the world is not simply black and white.

Instead we must put two arguments (or theories) in a relationship with one another. This may well bring out the underlying meaning and it allows us to move beyond a simple idea of liking one argument or another. It is also practice in the use of abstract concepts – a vital part of academic study. The major concepts in an area of study are major concepts because they relate to so many arguments and often because their use provides us with the ability to get beyond surface appearances or impressions.

Let’s take a worked example. Below are two arguments about regulation of the media, based around a discussion of Page 3 – a page featuring a topless model in the popular Sun newspaper. First is a summary of an argument by Heeswijk in the Independent. Second is a summary of an article by Shiner, from the online magazine Spiked. After the summaries there is an attempt to compare the two arguments. To do this there is an academic comparison of both writers’ understanding of the state and of civil society. To make this comparison also required explaining how the writers understand the public sphere and the media.

Hopefully this comparison illustrates how it is possible to use theories to provide insights into the underlying arguments and their meanings.

1) Heeswijk argues that the portrayal of women in the press is “a form of discrimination”. Endemic sexist reporting undermines women’s self-esteem, thus limiting women’s participation in the public sphere, and encourages men to see women as unequal, potentially leading to violence against women. Rather than being a question of taste and decency on which people might have different views, for Heeswijk, this is discrimination in action and so a question of equality. To stop the discrimination that comes with negative stereotypes and the portrayal of women based on looks, requires regulation of the media. Heeswijk suggests that newspapers which portray women as sex objects should be made more difficult to obtain by being removed from ready access in newsagents and by stopping sales to minors. She also argues that the Leveson Inquiry should tackle the reporting of rape and the portrayal of women more generally through having such reports scrutinised for signs of sexism by future regulators. Heeswijk makes pains to argue that “this is not about censorship” rather it is about getting press that “serves the public interest” and, “at the very least, does no harm”. (187 words)

2) Shiner objects to groups such as “Turn Your Back on Page 3” campaigning against Page 3 and the sexist portrayal of women in the press. She argues they are falsely portraying themselves as representatives of women as a means to try to “force [their] views on the public” by calling for the regulation of the press. Rather than countering the negative portrayal of women, Shiner sees such campaigns themselves as presenting women as weak, pathetic and powerless needing “paternalistic” censorship by regulators to sort out sexism and protect them. Likewise she objects to the view of men by such groups as “uncontrollable beasts” merely reacting to female flesh. Any combatting of discrimination rather than being the “government’s responsibility”, for Shiner, must come from “society” i.e. it is a question of politics and culture rather than of regulation from above. Ultimately, Shiner sees no problem in women being photographed naked. Rather the problem is the attempt to curtail freedom even to the extent of not trusting women to judge for themselves what jobs they might want to take and how they might want to express their sexuality. (186 words)

Comparison

3A) The two authors differ strongly in how they see both the state and civil society. Heeswijk follows the media effects school in directly linking media portrayals to psychological attitudes (self-esteem in women and sexist attitudes in men). In reading public viewpoints from media representations, she sees the public sphere as the location of problems, of discrimination, and downplays the ability of individuals to act for themselves (or collectively through civil society groups orientated towards the public) to counter such discrimination. In discounting the public she sees it as the role of enlightened groups to call on the state to regulate public life and especially the media as powerful and destructive private interests. In this view the state sits above society and is the only powerful actor not captured by media concerns and so able to play a progressive role.

3B) Shiner by contrast prioritises freedom of expression both for those who might want to be glamour models and for those that might want to campaign for equality through public engagement – such as women who might want to “to speak up and prove the illegitimacy of sexist attitudes by themselves”. This unconstrained public sphere can then become both the place where individuals express the interests and concerns they have but also find others and act with them in civil society groups to try to further their interests (often by influencing the public i.e. for Shiner “society”). The media here is less important in the sense that it itself does not determine the public’s consciousness, but also more important as a key site where public discussions take place and where civil society groups might want to communicate their interests. Where the state limits freedom of expression this impoverishes the public sphere and with it civil society. State regulation to enforce particular moral standards or political viewpoints is understood by Shiner as an elite imposition on the public which undermines and demobilises the activities of civil society but also, in the end, fails to address any underlying problems. (334)